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Over the past two centuries, the police have perpetrated massacres in response to protest action 
in numerous countries. Available scholarly literature has typically focused on the circumstances that 
contributed to such mass killings, but rarely has there been consideration of the impact that such 
massacres subsequently may have had on the police organisation. Hence, this article will explore 
the relationship between massacres perpetrated by the police and police reform, with a particular 
focus on South Africa. The article concludes that, in the context of public order policing, massacres 
perpetuated by the police can contribute towards relatively immediate police reforms, particularly in 
terms of police strategies and tactics. In some circumstances, massacres have even led to some 
restructuring of the police organisation. The nature of the government and the policing environment 




In August 1819, 17 people were killed and 
hundreds were injured during a protest for 
parliamentary reform at St Peter’s Fields in 
Manchester, England, as a result of a cavalry 
charge by the sabre-wielding yeomanry. This 
incident has commonly become known as the 
‘Peterloo Massacre’ and, as many policing 
scholars have argued, was an important event 
in the founding of the modern police. This 
massacre underscored for parliamentarians 
as well as the ruling elite that military troops 
were an inappropriate mechanism for the 
policing of protests, and ultimately contributed 
to the creation of the civilian-oriented London 
Metropolitan Police in 1829.1 This police model 
was gradually adopted by numerous states and 
has now become one of the more prevalent 
police models in most democratic contexts.
Over the past two centuries the police have 
perpetuated massacres in response to protest 
action in many countries, such as Brazil, 
Ethiopia, France, Peru, the Philippines, South 
Africa, Ukraine, the United States and Yemen 
(to name but a few). A police massacre is in 
essence a specific incident that entails the 
indiscriminate killing of a large number of 
people by an official government police entity. 
Scholarly literature has typically focused on the 
circumstances that contributed to such mass 
killings, but rarely has there been consideration 
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of the impact that such massacres may 
subsequently have had on police organisations. 
This is somewhat surprising, given the key role 
that a massacre played in the establishment of 
the modern police model. This article therefore 
explores the relationship between massacres 
perpetrated by the police and police reform, with 
a particular focus on South Africa.
In the policing literature reform is typically 
associated with the refashioning of the police 
with a view to forging more democratic 
approaches to policing.2 However, this article, 
drawing on the work of Styles,3 makes use of 
a broader definition of police reform, namely 
changes that are made to the police with the 
aim of improving police work and the functioning 
of the police organisation for all government 
types, not only democracies. Under this 
definition, police reform can, in effect, entail the 
adoption of more repressive policing methods 
and can include the acquisition of military-style 
equipment in the context of an authoritarian 
regime, as such reforms are typically geared 
towards improving the regime’s prospects of 
maintaining its oppressive rule and authority.
Using this broader conceptualisation of police 
reform, this article will address the following 
research question: what types of police reforms 
in South Africa were implemented after major 
massacres perpetrated by the police, and why? 
The article will analyse the relationship between 
various prominent massacres perpetrated by
the police in South Africa between 1920 and 
2012, and the subsequent police reforms (or the 
lack thereof). 
Massacres and police reforms
A reading of published police histories from 
a variety of countries suggests that there is a 
conceivable relationship between massacres 
perpetrated and reforms implemented by the 
police. What is evident, however, is that the 
context and nature of each massacre was key 
to determining whether or not police reforms 
would be pursued in its aftermath. In essence, 
five propositions can be derived from the 
literature, as outlined below.
Firstly, the police will adopt reforms where 
massacres result in significant injuries and 
casualties to the police, or where they realise 
that such forceful tactics may contribute 
to more large-scale protests. This was the 
case with the Haymarket riot in Chicago in 
1886, where a bomb was hurled at the police 
during a militant labour demonstration. Four 
protestors and seven policemen were killed 
in the ensuing events. Thereafter the police 
altered their tactics and engaged in undercover 
operations in order to pre-empt further violent 
confrontations with protestors. Two years later, 
the Chicago police declared that the lesson 
they had learned from such changes to policing 
tactics was that ‘the revolutionary movement 
must be carefully observed and crushed if 
it showed signs of growth’.4 A more recent 
example took place in Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, 
where the police reportedly adopted less lethal 
approaches to public order policing after their 
violent crackdown on striking oil workers in 
2011 resulted in the death of 15 strikers. These 
changes were based on concerns that further 
police repression might lead to a surge in anti-
government agitation.5
Secondly, the police will initiate a reform process 
following a massacre where they perceive that 
they were unprepared for the protest encounter 
and overwhelmed by the protestors. This 
has mainly been the case where repressive 
governments have changed policing strategies 
and tactics following a massacre in an attempt 
to contain and quash further protest action 
that could ultimately result in the demise of the 
authoritarian regime. For example, in 2005 the 
Ethiopian police, who had a history of extensive 
human rights abuses,6 massacred close to 
200 protesters and injured more than 700, 
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following contested election results.7 Following 
this massacre, the Ethiopian police reportedly 
received considerable military-style riot control 
training from the South African Police Service 
(SAPS), and purchased significant amounts 
of more modern riot control equipment and 
weaponry.8 Furthermore, the Ethiopian police 
sought to forge more effective relationships 
with communities in order to ‘strengthen 
support for the police and to further the 
gathering of intelligence’.9
Thirdly, there will be no apparent police reforms 
after a massacre in cases where the protestors 
did not pose a significant threat, or did not 
inflict significant casualties on the police, and 
there was no political will to hold the police to 
account for their actions. A clear example was 
the massacre of approximately 200 protestors 
of North African descent by the Paris police 
in 1961, which was during the time of the 
Algerian civil war.10 There were no indications 
that the Paris police underwent any significant 
changes thereafter, other than the intensification 
of intelligence-gathering activities in relation to 
dissident groups.11 A further example was the 
1987 Mendiola Massacre in the Philippines 
where the police killed 13 people who were 
protesting for agrarian reform. There were no 
police casualties, and no immediate police 
reform, despite a government-wide process of 
democratisation.12 There were similar dynamics 
after a massacre in the Malaysian village of 
Memali in November 1985, where police killed 
14 members of an Islamic sect.13
Fourthly, police reform will be pursued after 
massacres have taken place in the context 
of regime change such as a transition to 
democratic rule, where the police had previously 
been responsible for the excessive use of 
violence against civilians (including massacres). 
Examples here include Chile, Indonesia, 
Namibia and South Africa. In some instances, 
as with Ukraine, a massacre by police was the 
catalyst for more immediate changes in policing. 
In this case the Ukrainian ‘Berkut’ riot police 
were disbanded because they shot unarmed 
demonstrators during anti-government protests 
in Kiev in 2014. This was part of a larger police 
reform process that was pursued after the 
ousting of the Yanukovych government.14
Fifthly, democratic police reforms towards the 
use of less repressive measures following a 
massacre are only likely where there have been 
concerted efforts by governments to implement 
a reform process. This is because the police as 
an institution are acutely resistant to change, 
and resolute external pressure is therefore often 
required to compel the police towards reform.15 
For example, in Mexico, following the massacre 
of 43 students in Iguala in September 2014 by 
an organised criminal group (these students had 
previously been abducted by corrupt police and 
then handed over to the criminal group), the 
government initiated a legislative police reform 
process, focusing in particular on the municipal 
level. However, to date this process has been 
undermined by political wrangling.16
These five propositions will be used in the 
following sections as the basis to further 
examine the nature of the relationship between 
massacres and police reforms in South Africa 
since the creation of the Union of South Africa 
in 1910. The focus will be on the key massacres 
that were perpetrated by the police in the 
1920s; the Sharpeville massacre (1960); the 
Soweto uprising (1976); massacres that took 
place during the mid to late 1980s; and the 
Marikana massacre (2012). 
Public order policing in South Africa: 
a brief historical overview
Between 1910 and 1993 the South African 
Police (SAP) generally resorted to the use of 
force (or the threat thereof) in order to disperse 
and quell agitated crowds of black people. 
This was motivated by concerns that localised 
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protest action could rapidly escalate into more 
widespread collective disorder in other black 
communities, which in turn could spill over 
geo-racial urban boundaries and threaten the 
apartheid status quo. Militant strike action by 
white mine workers in 1921/22 also resulted 
in a repressive police response, fuelled by 
concerns that such protests would significantly 
undermine the mining industry, which was a key 
component of the South African economy.17
The SAP typically policed protests in townships 
at arm’s length, using an arsenal of military-style 
vehicles and incapacitants (such as tear gas). 
If required, SAP members would engage in a 
baton charge and use sjamboks on protestors. 
Lethal force (including live ammunition) was 
applied on those occasions where protestors 
breached the SAP buffer zone, or if the crowd 
did not adhere to instructions from the police.18 
However, as will be shown below, there were 
a number of occasions where the SAP was 
unprepared for the intensity of public protests 
and organised defiance, which resulted in the 
police injudiciously using excessive lethal force 
in an effort to repel and disperse protestors. 
Frequently, large numbers of protestors died 
as a result. 
There was a series of militarised reforms to 
public order policing in the 1980s and early 
1990s, which will be discussed in more detail 
in the sections below. Substantial efforts were 
made to reform the police after the 1994 
democratic elections, which included the 
restructuring of public order policing. 
Port Elizabeth (1920) and the 
Bulhoek massacre (1921)
In the early 1920s the SAP used excessive force 
against a series of strikes and uprisings by black 
South Africans so as to enforce racial and class 
segregation and to ensure that these incidents 
of protest did not result in more widespread 
insurrection and disruption to the economy. 
In at least two such confrontations police 
personnel massacred black protestors in 
the Eastern Cape, namely in Port Elizabeth 
and Bulhoek. 
In October 1920, in the midst of a militant 
strike instigated by a faction of the Port 
Elizabeth Industrial and Commercial Workers’ 
(Amalgamated) Union of Africa, a combined 
force of police and deputised white civilians 
opened fire on unarmed black protestors 
outside a police station in Port Elizabeth. Some 
24 black protestors were killed. The shooting 
resulted in rapid dispersal of the protestors,19 
and there were no police casualties. Prior to this 
massacre there had been general anxiety among 
white residents, not only in Port Elizabeth but 
also countrywide, that the strike would rapidly 
escalate into widespread violence with black 
mobs attacking white homes and businesses. 
According to the Inspector of Labour, W Ludorf: 
[U]nless prompt action had been taken, 
Port Elizabeth would have been in 
the throes of something too awful to 
contemplate … in my considered opinion 
the prompt action taken in firing is fully 
justified and quelled a very serious native 
revolt against constituted authority.20
In 1921 the SAP, in conjunction with the military, 
used overwhelming force to suppress an 
uprising in Bulhoek near Queenstown. In 
this instance, a contingent of around 800 
policemen opened fire on members of a 
religious sect, the ‘Israelites’, who were armed 
with swords and assegais and were illegally 
occupying government land. Previous attempts 
by government authorities to disperse the 
squatters through negotiation and threat of 
force had failed.21 A military-style police action 
was subsequently mounted, which led to the 
massacre of approximately 200 cult members, 
with more than 100 others wounded.22
In line with the third proposition (that there will 
be no apparent police reforms after a massacre 
9SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 63 • MARCH 2018
in cases where the protestors did not pose a 
significant threat) no noticeable police reforms 
were pursued in the aftermath of these two 
massacres. This was most likely because the 
protesting groups did not pose a significant 
threat to the police, who, with their superior 
firepower, were easily able to quash the protest 
actions. Furthermore, the risk of these two 
protests, igniting unrest in other areas of South 
Africa was relatively low at the time.
Sharpeville massacre (1960)
In March 1960, in the township of Sharpeville 
near Vereeniging, approximately 300 police 
opened fire on a crowd of thousands of Pan 
Africanist Congress supporters who were 
protesting against the pass system, killing 69 
and injuring approximately 180 people. First-
hand accounts of the massacre suggest that the 
policemen on the scene, feeling overwhelmed 
and fearful, opened fire on the protestors in a 
state of agitation.23 This incident was a wake-
up call for government, who realised that black 
communities had become less compliant with 
apartheid regulations and policing techniques, 
and that more organised anti-apartheid 
opposition had developed in a number of 
townships.24 During parliamentary debates 
immediately following the massacre, De Villiers 
Graaff, the leader of the opposition party at 
the time, expressed concern that in townships 
where there had been unrest, ‘agitators were 
receiving more support from natives who were 
usually law abiding’.25 
By 1961, as a direct result of the Sharpeville 
massacre, and in line with the second 
proposition (that the police will initiate a 
reform process following a massacre where 
they perceive that they were unprepared for 
the protest encounter) there were significant 
organisational changes within the SAP. The 
number of white policemen in the force was 
increased substantially, and the Reserve Police 
Force (a part-time citizen force) was created.26 
Additional funds were allocated to the SAP 
to procure the ‘most modern equipment in 
order to crush any threat to internal security 
successfully’.27 There was also a reconfiguration 
of the SAP’s territorial policing boundaries, with 
the SAP’s administrative geographical divisions 
being reconfigured to allow for more effective 
collaboration with the South African Defence 
Force (SADF). A government committee was 
subsequently established to reform police 
training in order ‘to ensure that police constables 
in the future will be better equipped for their task 
both physically and mentally and will have better 
knowledge of their exacting duties’.28
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Sharpeville 
massacre, the size and budget of the security 
branch within the SAP increased considerably.29 
From the early 1960s the security branch 
sought to disrupt the activities of anti-apartheid 
groups and liberation movements by capturing 
or neutralising their leaders and operatives. 
In order to achieve this the security branch 
required actionable intelligence, which was 
generated through a large network of informers, 
the infiltration of anti-apartheid movements 
and the extensive use of detention, harsh 
interrogation and torture of suspected anti-
government activists.30 Furthermore, from 
the early 1960s, the security branch used 
interrogation and torture in order to ‘turn’ 
certain captured insurgents into informers 
(known as askaris) who could infiltrate the 
liberation movements.31
Soweto uprising (1976)
In June 1976, approximately 10 000 school 
learners and adults took to the streets of Soweto 
outside Johannesburg to protest against the 
government’s requirement that Afrikaans be 
used as a mandatory medium of instruction 
in schools. Confrontations between the riot 
police and the protestors rapidly escalated 
and culminated in the police fatally shooting 
more than 400 demonstrators and injuring 
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approximately 3 000.32 Shortly thereafter, violent 
protests erupted in townships on the East 
Rand and in Cape Town, which the SAP, with 
the support of the SADF, forcefully subdued.33 
In total, the SAP discharged in the region of 
50 000 rounds of ammunition against 
protestors in all areas during the various 
uprisings at the time.34 
Providing feedback to Parliament on the Soweto 
violence, Jimmy Kruger, the cabinet minister 
responsible for the police, stated that policemen 
had opened fire in ‘self-defence’, as they felt 
that they were ‘overwhelmed’ and that ‘their 
lives were in grave danger’.35 The findings 
of the Cillié Commission of Inquiry36 into the 
causes of the Soweto uprising emphasised 
that the police on the scene were in imminent 
danger, and that the lethal actions of the SAP 
members were justified. The reasons given 
were that the policemen on the scene were 
significantly outnumbered by the protestors, 
who had thrown stones at the police, and 
had surrounded the police after less lethal 
attempts to disperse the protestors had failed. 
There were extensive references to the written 
statement by Sergeant MJ Hattingh, one of 
the policemen who had fired on the protestors. 
According to the commission report:
He [Sergeant Hattingh] saw that other 
members of the squad had been injured, 
some seriously, and it was clear to him 
that the crowd was going to overpower 
them. He was hit on the leg by a stone 
and fell down on the ground … he heard 
others firing … He got up and drew his 
firearm. A black man charged at him with 
a brick in his left hand and a kierie [stick] 
in his right hand. To beat off the attack, he 
fired straight at the man. The attacker fell 
down dead ... he fired five more shots at 
the legs of the charging crowd.37
The report further recounts that Hattingh was 
able to retreat to his police vehicle, but was 
subsequently surrounded by a group 
of protestors:
They [the protestors] tried to drag him 
out of the vehicle, grabbed his cap and 
ripped the badges from his uniform. His 
hand was injured by a sharp object and 
an attempt was made to take his firearm 
from him. Col. Kleingeld [the commanding 
officer on the scene] drove the attackers 
off with bursts from the automatic rifle, and 
the sergeant and his vehicle were removed 
from the danger area.38
Critically, the commission concluded that 
the hazardous situation in which the police 
found themselves was also largely the result 
of the SAP personnel on the scene being ill 
prepared and not sufficiently competent to 
effectively disperse such a large group of 
protestors. Hence, of direct relevance to the 
second proposition (that police reforms take 
place after a massacre where the police are 
of the view that they had been unprepared 
or overwhelmed by the protestors), the 
SAP’s public order policing capability was 
significantly improved at station level in the 
years immediately after the Soweto uprising, 
and the riot control function of the police 
was centralised into a riot control unit.39 
Furthermore, the SADF were tasked to support 
the SAP in crowd control incidents, based on 
the view that a display of overwhelming force 
would prompt protesting crowds to disperse 
without violent confrontation.40 
Policing under a state of 
emergency: 1984–1989
There was an intensification of mass lethal 
violence perpetrated by the police against 
black communities in the latter part of the 
1980s. Table 1 provides details of some of 
these massacres. This type of police violence 
followed on from the declaration of partial 
states of emergency in 1985 and 1986. 
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of ‘serious proportions’, and as having ‘made 
heavy demands on the available manpower’.45
Although it is not possible to exclusively 
link specific reform processes to particular 
massacres perpetrated by the SAP in the mid 
to late 1980s, the apartheid government, in the 
context of numerous massacres (listed in Table 
1), launched a new policing strategy, namely joint 
police/military crackdown operations in volatile 
townships with the stated objective of ‘restoring 
normality’.46 The SAP also imported more 
sophisticated riot control equipment, including 
helicopters and armoured vehicles fitted with 
water cannons.47 In 1986 President PW Botha 
announced that the personnel strength of the 
SAP would be increased by 16% from just over 
48 000 to 55 500.48 The Railways Police, which 
had been responsible for law enforcement and 
security in relation to the railway infrastructure 
and environment and had been historically 
separate from the SAP, was incorporated into 
the SAP. The SAP was also withdrawn from 
its national border protection responsibilities 
and replaced by soldiers. The size of the SAP 
was further increased during the latter part of 
the 1980s, with both the personnel size and 
budget of the SAP doubling between 1985 and 
1990.49 This fortification of the SAP was also 
ultimately driven by concerns of the National 
Party government that its ability to contain and 
diminish protests by black political movements 
was under severe pressure.
The National Peace Accord 
and public order policing
By 1990, violence and criminality had escalated 
in numerous townships and some rural areas, 
and threatened to overflow into the relatively 
serene white residential and commercial 
enclaves, fundamentally destabilising the efforts 
of the apartheid government to maintain order. 
In response, the apartheid government and 
various political groupings signed the National 






1984 Vaal Triangle 26
1985 Crossroads, Cape Town 18
1985 Lange, Uitenhage 20
1985 Springs, East Rand 10




1985 Mamelodi, Pretoria 12







1986 Vlaklaagte, KwaNdebele 12
1986 White City, Soweto 24
1988 Natal 11
1989 Cape Town 29
Table 1: Massacres perpetrated by the SAP,  
 1984–198942
Additionally, as stated in the 1985/86 SAP 
annual report, a ‘large part of the South African 
Police was used on a full-time basis to combat 
unrest … and [there was] intensified training of 
members, especially with regard to unrest and 
crowd control’.41
This police violence was linked to an 
unparalleled upsurge in the levels of protest 
violence against apartheid rule after the 
African National Congress (ANC) had called 
for mass mobilisation to ‘make townships 
ungovernable’.43 This resulted in the destruction 
of government buildings and attacks on local 
government officials, suspected police informers 
and even policemen, and the ANC also called 
on its cadres to ambush police patrols and seize 
their firearms ‘for future use’.44 This increase in 
township violence was acknowledged by the 
police in the 1984/85 SAP annual report, which 
referred to the violence as ‘large-scale’ and 
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to bring an end to intense and pervasive 
political and criminal violence. As part of the 
NPA framework, the Goldstone Commission 
of Inquiry was established to investigate 
such violence.50 Evidence gathered by this 
commission implicated some SAP members in 
providing clandestine support for mass killings 
in ANC-aligned communities, perpetrated by 
Inkatha-affiliated hostel dwellers, for example in 
Sebokeng, Swanieville and Boipatong.51 
As the fourth proposition (that police reforms 
will be pursued after massacres have taken 
place in the context of regime change) would 
suggest, the NPA included a major police 
reform imperative in response to the repressive 
and violent actions of the SAP. The NPA 
included a code of conduct, which specifically 
called for effective, non-partisan (or non-
political), racially inclusive and more legitimate, 
community-focused and accountable policing.52 
The Goldstone Commission proposed the 
Regulation of Gatherings Bill (1993), which 
was only enacted after the 1994 elections, and 
stipulated that the police may only use force 
when public disorder cannot be forestalled 
through other non-violent methods.
The SAP’s public order policing component 
was reorganised, but in a way that ran contrary 
to the spirit of the NPA. The Internal Stability 
Division (ISD) – a specialised militarised public 
order policing entity – was formed, with 
personnel who wore military-style camouflage 
uniforms, were armed with military-type 
weapons and were transported in military 
vehicles.53 Operational units were deployed to 
violence hotspots. In justifying the creation of 
the ISD, Hernus Kriel, the then minister of law 
and order, argued that: ‘A man in a blue uniform 
must control political unrest as well as crime, 
and it doesn’t work. That is why we believe 
there has to be a parting of ways.’54 
These reforms were not only owing to 
operational considerations. The changes were 
also linked to political insecurities within the 
National Party government with regard to its 
ability to exercise effective control across South 
Africa, which was seen as waning considerably, 
and fears that its position would be weakened 
during the negotiations for a new constitution.55 
Post-apartheid policing and 
the Marikana massacre
Since 1994 there have been various attempts 
to reform the public order component of the 
SAPS. In 1995, the SAPS public order policing 
unit was established, which merged personnel 
from the former riot units and internal stability 
units from the SAP and the various police 
forces from the self-governing Bantustan areas 
within South Africa, such as the Transkei and 
Ciskei. This merger was linked to the overall 
democratic policing reforms at the time, and 
aimed to engender a ‘more soft approach than 
previous historical methods’ to the policing of 
gatherings, marches and protests (including 
showing restraint and using force as a last 
resort).56 Public order policing personnel were 
‘re-selected’ and underwent training by Belgian 
police instructors, based on international 
standards of crowd management.57 This 
aimed to produce a slimmed down version of 
the apartheid riot control behemoth, but the 
public order policing unit remained a significant 
structure within the SAPS, totalling 7 610 
members in 1997.58
The public order component was rebranded, 
reoriented and its members re-trained on 
two occasions. In 2001, following a reported 
decrease in incidents of public violence, these 
units were renamed area crime combating units 
(ACCUs). Informed by the principles of sector 
policing, the ACCUs were assigned an adjusted 
mandate to focus on serious and violent crimes. 
This was based on the SAPS assessment 
that incidents of violent public disorder had 
notably declined; moreover, there was a 
political imperative from cabinet for the SAPS to 
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prioritise efforts to reduce violent interpersonal 
crime, particularly in high crime areas.59 Five 
years later the ACCUs were further rationalised 
into crime combating units (CCUs) with some 
2 595 dedicated members. Specialised public 
order policing units were re-established in 
2011 into 27 units with a total of 4 721 SAPS 
members, following an upsurge in violent 
protest actions.60
Despite these efforts, significant democratic 
reforms did not become effectively embedded 
within the ethos of the public order policing 
entities. Research undertaken in the early 2000s 
revealed that the leadership and members of 
the public order policing units were unwilling 
to relinquish ‘established practices and 
symbolic representations of “discipline”’, which 
undermined ‘attempts at developing more 
participatory management techniques with 
consequences for broader transformational 
agendas’.61 Added to this, the ACCUs and the 
CCUs were heavily armed, sported military-style 
uniforms, made use of military organisational 
terms, such as ‘company’ and ‘platoon’, and 
retained a militarised outlook. In addition, such 
organisational changes resulted in an aggregate 
dilution of specialised public order policing 
knowledge and expertise.62 Training in this 
regard was also deprioritised.63
In August 2012, SAPS members opened fire 
on striking platinum mineworkers in Marikana 
(North West province), killing 34 and injuring 78 
protestors. Due to mounting public pressure, 
an official commission of inquiry (the Farlam 
Commission) was established to investigate the 
massacre.64 In its submission to the commission 
the SAPS stated that those police that 
discharged their firearms against the striking 
mineworkers had done so in self-defence, as 
the mineworkers had behaved in a threatening 
manner, and appeared as though they intended 
to attack the police on the scene. The SAPS 
further stated that the mineworkers had ignored 
the police’s instruction to lay down their weapons 
(which were mainly spears, sjamboks and sticks); 
that less lethal forms of crowd control, such as 
the use of water cannons, tear gas and rubber 
bullets, had failed to disperse the protestors; and 
that the police had been fired upon by at least 
one of the protestors.65
Evidence uncovered by journalists and 
researchers has suggested that a number of the 
deceased were executed by the police, some at 
point-blank range. Both published research and 
documentary films have strongly suggested that 
the police, acting in collusion with the affected 
mining companies and national government, 
adopted this strong-arm approach in an 
attempt to discourage widespread destabilisation 
of the mining sector labour force through 
additional strikes.66 
The Farlam Commission found that in 17 
of the deaths, the police ‘had reasonable 
grounds to believe that their lives and those of 
their colleagues were under threat … [which] 
justified them in defending themselves and 
their colleagues … but may have exceeded the 
bounds of self and private defence’.67 In relation 
to the other 17 deaths, the commission indicated 
that the deaths were likely the result of ineffective 
control by the SAPS that led to a ‘chaotic free-
for-all’.68 In sum, the commission attributed 
all of the deaths to overly-militarised policing 
methods used by the SAPS tactical units that 
had been ceded command-and-control during 
the massacre. 
In line with the second proposition (that the 
police perceive that they are unprepared for 
the protest encounters), the SAPS indicated in 
its 2012/13 annual report that its public order 
policing units required additional resources, 
and that coordination structures had been 
established after the Marikana massacre to 
improve the SAPS response to, and investigation 
of, incidents of public disorder, with a focus on 
the prosecution of those responsible for such 
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violence.69 Furthermore, in the 2013 State of the 
Nation address, Zuma instructed the Justice, 
Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (of which 
the SAPS is a component) to institute measures 
to ensure that violent protest actions ‘are acted 
upon, investigated and prosecuted’.70
In addition, in 2014, while the Farlam 
Commission was still in existence, the SAPS 
sought support from the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Police for its plans to acquire in 
excess of R3 billion from the National Treasury 
to fund its ‘turnaround’ public order policing 
strategy. This entailed plans to substantially 
increase the number of public order policing 
units (from 27 to 50) and their personnel 
strength (from 4 721 to 8 759); and acquire 
large quantities of more forceful riot control 
equipment, such as armoured vehicles, stun/
anti-riot grenades, crowd dispersal acoustic 
devices and training facilities. Their motivation 
for the request was that violent incidents of 
public disorder had increased from 971 in 
2010/11 to 1 882 in 2012/13, and that it 
was ‘anticipated that this upsurge against 
state authority w[ould] not decline in the 
foreseeable future’.71
The Farlam Commission recommended in its 
2015 report that public order policing in South 
Africa should be significantly reformed. In 
particular, it advocated that the use of automatic 
military assault firearms by police should be 
discontinued in the policing of protests; and that 
clear guidelines should be issued with regard 
to when the paramilitary components of the 
SAPS, such as the Tactical Response Team, 
are to be deployed in support of public order 
policing. It also recommended that a panel of 
experts should be established to determine 
amended rules and procedures for public order 
policing, based on international best practice. It 
also recommended that SAPS personnel should 
be effectively trained in relation to these rules 
and procedures.72 There have, however, been 
criticisms of the commission’s findings, based 
on the view that it did not adequately 
and fairly engage with the accounts of the 
striking mineworkers.73
In 2016, based on the findings of the 
commission, the South African Treasury 
allocated additional budgetary resources to 
the SAPS for public order policing.74 In the 
same year, the Minister of Police appointed 
the panel of experts recommended by the 
Farlam Commission, and indicated that training 
in public order policing for police cadets had 
been increased from two to three weeks.75 A 
new national police instruction has also recently 
been finalised that replaces the previous public 
order policing standing order. This instruction 
declares that public order policing units are to 
be in control of the policing of public protests, 
and that authority should not be transferred to 
the more militarised tactical units of the SAPS. 
However, to date no funds have been provided 
to enhance independent oversight of the SAPS 
and to investigate abuses allegedly perpetrated 
by SAPS members.76
Conclusion
By means of a historical analysis of South Africa 
this article has explored five propositions in 
terms of the relationship between massacres 
perpetrated by the police, and subsequent 
police reform. It has demonstrated that in the 
context of public order policing, massacres 
by the police can contribute towards relatively 
immediate police reforms, particularly in terms 
of police strategies and tactics. In some 
circumstances, massacres even led to some 
restructuring of the police organisation. 
The nature of the government and the 
environment of policing appeared to be key 
determinants of the types of police reforms 
post-massacre. That is, under apartheid, in 
instances where the police had felt that the 
protest action that culminated in the massacre 
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was a serious threat to their ability to sustain 
social control, more militarised and oppressive 
reforms were pursued. This was the case with 
the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres. On the 
other hand, in the absence of a perceived threat 
to the police such police violence did not lead to 
noticeable police reforms, for example with the 
Bulhoek and Port Elizabeth massacres. 
Furthermore, following a series of massacres 
and intense political violence, the successful 
negotiation of a peace agreement, the NPA, 
resulted in some restructuring of the SAP in 
the early 1990s. In addition, the events in the 
aftermath of the Marikana massacre, which 
took place under a democratic regime, show 
that mass lethal violence by the police has 
spurred initial attempts at reforming public 
order policing.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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